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Demand Side Analysis of Microlending Markets in Germany
*
 
In developing and transition economies, microlending has become an effective instrument for 
providing micro businesses with the necessary financial resources to launch operations. In 
the industrialized countries, with their highly developed banking systems, however, there has 
been ongoing debate on the question of whether an uncovered demand for microlending 
services exists. The present pilot study explores customer preferences for microlending 
products in Germany. Among the interviewed business owners, 15% reported revolving 
funding needs and an interest in microloans. We find that potential recipients of microloan 
products are retail business owners, foreign business owners, and persons who had 
previously received private loans. Furthermore, financial products should feature rapid 
access to short-term loans. 
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1. Introduction 
Self-employment  has  become  a  buzzword  in  European  economic  policy.  In 
Germany, for instance, the number of self-employed persons has risen from 3.0 to 
4.2 million in the last 15  years (see Piorkowsky  and Fleißig, 2008).  It is further 
estimated that every year up to 500,000 people start their own business, most of them 
as  micro  entrepreneurs  with  no  further  employees  and  small  amounts  of  capital, 
usually  below  €25,000.  Access  to  sufficient  capital  to  start  operations  or  further 
develop their activities is a difficulty faced by many of these businesses not only in 
Germany but also in other European countries (Eurobarometer, 2005). 
To  explain  why  businesses  face  such  problems  when  accessing  finance,  the 
asymmetric information approach (see e.g. Hillier and Ibrahimo, 1993) identifies two 
main  reasons  on  the  supply  side:  (1)  micro  businesses  usually  cannot  provide 
collateral. As a result, they are unable to signal their creditworthiness, and banks are 
unable  to  assess  the  credit  risk.  (2)  Owners  of  these  businesses  tend  to  take  out 
relatively small loan amounts. The fixed costs of granting such loans tend to eat up 
more than the profits from interest payments. Therefore, institutional lenders using 
standard credit technologies consider loans to this group as unprofitable. 
Evidence from developing, emerging and transition economies, however, has shown 
that  lending  in  this  market  segment  can  be  a  profitable  business  if  appropriate 
technologies  -  known  as  microlending  -  are  used  (Armendáriz  de  Aghion  and 
Morduch,  2005).  Microloans  have  a  technical  and  a  methodological  component. 
From a technical point of view, they are sized at the lowest possible level. In Western 
European  countries,  any  loan  below  €25,000 is  considered  as  microloan.  From  a 
methodological point of view, as Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch [2000] put it, 
“documentary  evidence  tends  to  be  de-emphasized  relative  to  standard  banking 
practices and local character assessment gains prominence.” 
Recently,  attempts  have  been  made  to  use  these  technologies  in  industrialized 
countries.  First  successes  of  microlending  approaches  in  Western  Europe  were 
reported by a French and a British microfinance institution (MFI), namely ADIE 
founded in 1988, and Street UK founded in 1999 (see EMN, 2006; CDFA, 2006). 
Based on these experiences the EU commission started a “joint action to support 
microfinance institutions in Europe” (JASMINE), an approach which should enable 
MFIs to get technical support and to use subsidies of the European Investment Fund 
as revolving capital for building regional microfinance funds. With the JASMINE 
initiative the EU commission emphasizes the importance of microfinance approaches 
as one instrument to realize the targets developed in the so called Lisbon strategy. 
Applying JASMINE to national institutions could, therefore, become a prerequisite   2 
to expand the number of microloans serving the financial needs of small and micro 
entrepreneurs. 
Given this decision it is crucial to analyze the potential demand for microloans in 
countries  like  Germany.  This  becomes  even  more  important  as  there  is  a  large 
number of initiatives similar to ADIE which were mostly financed with public funds, 
but  never  got  off  the  ground.  Their  failure,  though,  cannot  be  explained  by  low 
repayment rates. Instead, these initiatives created products that took in particular care 
of the supply side problems in this loan segment. As a consequence, entrepreneurs 
simply failed to apply for funding. A second short-coming of these approaches was 
that the restrictions imposed for the use of public funds made it nearly impossible for 
the MFIs to develop products focused on their target markets. 
Such experiences give reason to reconsider if MFIs should concentrate only on the 
supply  side  by  designing  microloans  which  mitigate  problems  of  information 
asymmetries, or also on the demand side through products responding to customers’ 
preferences. Woller (2002) advocates a radical shift in MFIs’ policies, moving away 
from a ‘product-driven’ microfinance culture and giving priority to customer needs. 
However,  to  date,  only  little  is  known  about  customer  preferences.  By  using  a 
relatively small but unique German data set, our paper aims to close this research 
gap. We analyze the funding needs of micro businesses; we describe the intended use 
of funds acquired by the business owners, and identify the financial sources typically 
used by entrepreneurs to cover their financial needs. By focusing on business owners 
who  financed  their  first  three  years’  operations  through  loans,  we  reveal  which 
businesses prefer microloans, and identify the product features that serve best their 
needs.  Thus,  based  on  our  pilot  study  we  provide  a  first  assessment  of  the 
microlending market in Germany which can also serve as a role model for larger 
studies or for the analysis of similar markets in Western European Countries. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  reviews  previous  theoretical  and 
empirical research results and outlines our research agenda. Sections 3 and 4 describe 
the data and present the empirical analysis. In Section 5 we provide a conclusion 
showing that microfinance in Germany (and other western European countries) will 
only be (more) successful if the peculiarities of both, the supply and the demand side 
of a microlending market will be adequately addressed. 
 
 
   3 
2. Previous Research 
2.1 Microlending Theory 
In  his  review  paper,  Morduch  (1999)  demonstrates  why  micro  businesses  are 
excluded from access to credit markets and why microlending is apt to solve this 
problem. While finance theory generally posits that all firms have equal access to 
financial markets and that all share similar competitive positions (van Auken and 
Neeley, 1996), micro businesses - when compared to larger businesses - face more 
difficulties or are even excluded from access to credit markets. 
A  considerable  body  of  theoretical  literature  deals  with  the  idea  that  asymmetric 
information is the main reason of these specific difficulties (Jaffee and Russel, 1976; 
Besanko and Thakor, 1987a, 1987b). This idea rests on two assumptions about the 
lack  of  financial  capital  observed  among  micro  businesses:  (1)  Lenders  cannot 
distinguish between high and low-risk borrowers, and potential borrowers are short 
of standard collateral which is why they cannot easily signal their own risk-taking 
behavior leading from the lender’s point of view to the typical problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard (cf. e.g. Morduch, 1999). (2) Given that persons running 
micro  businesses  mostly  ask  for  very  small  loan  sizes,  it  is  not  feasible  in  the 
traditional banking system to substitute the missing signal by additional screening 
and  monitoring  efforts.  As  a  consequence,  credit  is  rationed  where  the  amount 
lenders are willing to offer is limited, or where no lender is willing to make any loans 
to this kind of borrowers (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
These problems can be addressed by implementing microlending technologies into 
the  lending  process:  Financial  statement  analysis  combined  with  collateral  in  the 
form  of  inventory  and  accounts  receivable  (being  the  typical  banking  practice  in 
small business finance, for more details see Berger and Udell, 2003) is substituted by 
an  assessment  of  various  factors:  the  applicant’s  i)  personality  traits,  ii) 
entrepreneurial abilities and iii) entrepreneurial knowledge. The information gathered 
is then evaluated based on a credit scoring methodology. 
The asymmetric information approach also has implications for the demand side of 
loan  markets.  According  to  the  pecking  order  theory  (Myers,  1984),  businesses 
adhere to a hierarchy of financing sources where cheapest funds are used first. As 
costs are also determined by the information problems of each capital source, Myers 
and Majluf (1984) expect that internal funds - own capital and cash flow - are the 
cheapest financial source for business owners, followed by funds and loans provided 
from family members and friends. If further funds from external sources are needed, 
loans from banks are preferred to external private equity such as venture capital (see 
Myers, 1984, or Scherr et al., 1993).   4 
Concluding, the asymmetric information approach is apt to explain behavior of both 
sides of microfinance markets, according to which banks face adverse selection and 
moral  hazard  problems,  while  business  owners  are  expected  to  prefer  internal 
financing when available and debt over equity when external financing is required. 
2.2 Empirical Evidence on Financial Sources of Micro Businesses 
Having shown that microlending is more than just lending very small amounts of 
money to business owners, this subsection presents an empirical overview on self-
employment, the financial means which are typically used by self-employed and on 
financing constraints in Germany. Technically speaking, microloans are loans with a 
short  term  maturity  (a  maximum  of  2-3  years)  and  loan  sizes  below  €25,000. 
Businesses considered eligible for such a loan type are micro businesses where the 
business owner is a solo-entrepreneur or employs not more than 5 persons in the 
business and has a turnover below €1 million per year.
5 One may expect, however, 
that  persons  who  are  interested  into  these  kinds  of  loans  are  typically  business 
owners with a yearly turnover of less than €100,000. 
Against this background, the German MSME sector (the micro, small and medium 
sized enterprises) comprises of 4.2 million businesses in 2007. Around 90% of them 
have a yearly turnover of less than €1m, 70% of them of less than €100,000, and 
56% are run by solo-entrepreneurs (see Piorkowsky and Fleißig, 2008 and Wallau, 
2006). In recent years, the average year-to-year survival rate of all businesses has 
been 92.5% (Constant and Zimmermann, 2005). The number of start-ups was around 
500,000 over the last years, with a relatively strong drop to 425,000 in 2007 (see IfM 
Bonn, 2008). It is estimated that every second firm was created out of unemployment 
(Caliendo and Kritikos, 2007). 
According to the MSME-panel of the German state-owned bank KfW, 75% of all 
MSME did not use any external financing (KfW 2007). Very similar numbers were 
reported by Kohn and Spengler (2008) and in a much larger and representative study 
by Caliendo and Kritikos (2007). Further information on the business owners who 
made use of external financing, is reported in the KfW–panel (KfW 2007). They 
found that in almost all cases those 25% who needed external funds preferred loans 
and overdrafts.
6 Venture capital plays a negligible role. In every second case, loan 
volumes were below €25,000 meaning that around 13% of all existing MSMEs in 
                                                 
5 It is important to note that there is no common definition. The above definition resembles to the 
German Institute for Small Business Research (IfM Bonn). In the EU a micro-business is defined as a 
business with not more than 10 persons and a turnover of less than €2 Million. For an overview of 
definitions and data, see also the European Microfinance Network (EMN), 2006. 
6 Using the US data, Bitler, Robb and Wolken (2001) revealed similar evidence that commercial 
banks are the dominant source of financial services of these kinds of businesses while Harhoff and 
Körting (1998) found out that lending is typically heavily concentrated on one or two financing 
institutions in the MSME segment.   5 
Germany operate with loan sizes below €25,000. However, these data give no clue 
whether business owners faced any financing constraints. 
Little is known about the alternatives of borrowing capital below €25,000. Inside and 
outside  the  formal  banking  system  micro  business  owners  have  some  funding 
alternatives that are well documented. KfW offers several loan products aimed at 
small  and  micro  businesses  in  their  start-up  phase.  Maximum  maturities  vary 
between five and ten years, and maximum loan amounts range between €10,000 and 
€50,000. According to Evers and Lahn (2007), about 1,500 loans up to €25,000 have 
been extended by KfW in 2006. These are microloans only in terms of their size, 
though; the applied methods resemble those used for small business loans and not 
those presented in section 2.1. 
Outside the formal banking system there  are about 30 different regional or local 
MFIs,  of  which  more  than  10  jointed  the  network  of  the  German  Microfinance 
Institute (DMI) which was found in 2004 and started operations in 2005 (see Kreuz, 
2006).  All  of  them  apply  to  a  certain  extent  microlending  methods  as  described 
above. Another 2,000 loans were actually approved by these 30 institutions in 2006 
(Evers  and  Lahn,  2007).
7  This  indicates  that  there  is  a  substantial  gap  between 
businesses operating with loans below €25,000 (namely 13% of all entrepreneurs or 
around 500,000 businesses if the methods of extrapolation employed in the KfW 
panel are correct) and those businesses which were financed with microloans. 
Thus, there must be other sources of loans which are used by micro business owners 
in  this  sector.  There  are  three  more  options:  First,  Berger  and  Udell  (1998) 
emphasize the importance of private loans for this segment. Second, banks might 
also be willing to offer business loans below €25,000, or, third, business loans are 
replaced by consumer loans (for first evidence on the latter suggestion, cf. Kneiding 
and Kritikos, 2007). However, the above mentioned data  give no information on 
these sources. 
Last but not least we have to focus on the question whether micro businesses are 
facing financial constraints. Such constraints may have two aspects, namely higher 
efforts  for  capital  acquisition  (compared  to  larger  companies)  and  complete 
exclusion from access to loans. There are several studies analyzing whether credit 
rationing  is  an  economically  significant  phenomenon.  For  instance,  in  a 
Eurobarometer  (2005)  survey  investigating  MSME  finance  within  the  European 
Union, it was found that German owners of micro businesses seem to face greater 
hurdles  in  accessing  loans  compared  to  their  European  counterparts.  When 
evaluating the quality of bank services in terms of consultancy, sector-specific know-
                                                 
7 To compare these numbers with the two most prominent MFIs in Western Europe, ADIE in France 
financed in 2006 about 7,500 borrowers, while Street UK made about 2,000 loans.   6 
how,  general  knowledge  and  expertise,  and  the  suitability  of  the  loan  offers  to 
customer needs, German banks fared below average. Three earlier studies (Egeln et 
al., 1997; Winker, 1999; and Audretsch and Elstons, 2002) found that smaller firms 
face more problems while acquiring capital than larger firms.
8 
2.3 Research Agenda 
The following major questions will be addressed in this article: To what extent are 
there institutions financing businesses with loans below €25,000? Is there further 
empirical evidence on financing constraints in  Germany  and is there demand for 
microloans beyond the observed financing volume? What are the product preferences 
of  micro  businesses  and  which  variables  are  able  to  describe  target  groups  for 
microloans? 
To analyze these questions, we collected demand side data containing information 
(a) on the financing patterns of micro business owners (also in comparison to small 
businesses), (b) on their actual financing sources and (c) on their attitudes towards 
typical microlending products.  
As we examine the sources of capital available to these businesses, we are able to 
give further evidence to what extent micro businesses 
-  have investments below €25,000,  
-  face problems when trying to access loan volumes below €25,000, 
-  are excluded from access to finance. 
Based on these results, we compare in a second step the respondents with preferences 
for microloans with those respondents who were not interested in microloans, taking 
into account various characteristics such as previous experiences with banks, product 
preferences, and funding patterns (i.e., the amounts of capital needed each year). This 
enables us to identify the typical characteristics of potential microfinance clients and 
to describe the product features appropriate to increase the demand for microloans. 
Our approach has several advantages. First, our data set contains also information on 
failed businesses so that we are able to mitigate survivor bias. Second, we do not 
only observe the static  results of financial decisions but are  also able  to make a 
comparative static analysis revealing the efforts applicants faced until a loan contract 
was realized, thus giving further information on financing problems. Third, among 
all  observed  business  owners  we  identify  those  who  would  be  interested  in 
microloans enabling us to distinguish them from other business owners. 
                                                 
8 As was highlighted by Block et al. (2008) some of these studies may suffer from a survivor bias as 
only successful firms were in the data sets while failed firms were underrepresented.   7 
3. Sample description 
3.1 Overview of descriptive statistics 
Our data is derived from a survey that provides information on the sources of finance 
of different business owners during their first three years of operations. The survey 
was  conducted  between  mid-October  and  December  2005  in  the  form  of  213 
telephone interviews with people who had become entrepreneurs during the past five 
years. Survey participants were randomly selected from various client lists provided 
by German start-up centers in the provinces of Hesse and Bavaria. The lists were 
comprised of clients who had taken part in coaching and seminars held between 2000 
and  2003  and  who  were  then  preparing  to  launch  their  own  business.  Thus, 
comparing  to  most  previous  studies  this  data  set  has  one  advantage  and  one 
disadvantage.  On  the  one  side,  it  does  not  face  a  survivor  bias  as  it  contains 
successful as well as failed business owners. On the other side, we cannot exclude 
that  there  are  problems  of  inverse  causality  and  of  selectivity  as  the  persons  we 
surveyed participated in coaching and seminars.
9 
The  interviews  were  held  using  a  standardized  questionnaire  which  we  had 
developed  on  the  basis  of  34  non-standardized  personal  interviews  with  micro 
business owners, as well as through a focus group comprising seven participants. The 
majority of the questions were closed-ended which enabled respondents to answer 
unambiguously. When necessary, the interviewer gave additional explanations. 
The  questionnaire  was  designed  to  collect  a  wide  range  of  information  and  was 
divided  into  two  main  parts.  The  first  contained  questions  pertaining  to  funding 
patterns and sources of capital during the first three years of business operations. The 
second  part  dealt  with  possible  funding  problems  encountered  and  interest  of 
respondents  in  microlending  schemes.  We  interviewed  one  person  per  firm  (the 
owner-entrepreneur), and in the case of team-run companies, only the main person in 
charge.  An  important  advantage  of  our  data  set  is  that  we  were  able  to  avoid 
hypothetical  answers.  At  the  time  of  the  interview,  all  respondents  were  able  to 
provide  a  retrospective  view  of  funding  issues  since  all  of  them  had  been  either 
active in the market for three to five years or failed during this time span. 
- insert Table 1 about here - 
                                                 
9 In this context it is also important to note that two years later the same questionnaire was also used 
among 101 small and micro entrepreneurs in East Germany which were randomly selected from 
various client lists of start-up centers and of chambers of commerce in the region of Brandenburg. 
Interestingly, the results of the East German data were very similar when compared to the results 
which will be presented in sections 3 and 4 of this paper.   8 
Within the whole sample, 70% of respondents started without any external funds
10, 
19% received a loan from a bank, and 11% from friends or family. Another 11% 
faced  rejection  from  banks,  5%  of  the  complete  sample  expressed  their  need  for 
outside finance but neither banks nor friends and family provided them with a loan 
(see Table 1). As shown in section 2.2, other studies reported similar shares of micro 
entrepreneurs who received loans or launched their business without any need to get 
outside finance.
11 Thus, we conclude that with respect to the basic financial variables 
(in terms of the shares of outside finance) the average outcomes of our sample are 
similar  to  the  average  outcomes  of  larger  representative  samples  which  were 
observed in the same time period.  
Beyond  these  basic  results  our  data  allow  a  deeper  understanding  of  financing 
behavior of MSME businesses by making use of a comparative static analysis. We 
reveal the paths of capital acquisition which the borrowers had to pass once they 
decided to acquire external finance. Our data show that 64% of the persons stated 
that they started their business without any external finance (not even from friends 
and family) and that they neither needed any outside finance nor intended at any time 
to seek for outside finance. 
- insert Figure 1 about here - 
In their first three years of operations, the other 36% of respondents were in need of 
outside finance. 84% of this group applied for a bank loan,
12 and almost two-thirds 
were  successful,  i.e.,  they  were  able  to  cover  their  funding  needs  through  an 
installment  loan  or  an  overdraft  facility.
13  We  also  investigated  whether  those 
borrowers  who  finally  succeeded  in  getting  a  loan  from  a  bank  faced  temporal 
financing constraints in the sense that they had to apply more than once for a loan. 
Indeed we find that almost two thirds of respondents went to more than one bank to 
receive a loan, which resulted in elevated application efforts. 
Loan sizes ranged between €500 and €300,000. 75% of the loans were larger than 
€10,000; on the other hand, 75% of the loans were also smaller than €25,000. Among 
                                                 
10 The two most apparent reasons are i) low funding needs for the majority of start-ups, and ii) 
government support that strengthened the equity base. 
11 In a similar study, Fraser (2005) found that also in the UK, almost two out of three businesses had 
used personal savings as the principal source of finance to start the business, and one-third had 
received funds through a bank loan or a private loan. In this study similar to our approach, private 
loans from friends were counted as loans. 
12 Over 90% of business owners who had applied for a loan had a formal meeting with a bank 
employee where they explained their business concept. Of those who visited a bank, 72% inquired 
about a loan, 12% about an overdraft facility, and 16% about both. 
13 We cannot exclude that this rate of loan approval might be influenced by a sample selection bias as 
the interviewed business owners had received training and coaching during the start-up of their 
business. However, it should be emphasized that Kohn and Spengler (2008) report of a similar 
acceptance rate of loan applications. The same  holds true for acceptance rates  when the same 
questionnaire was in East Germany, see Kritikos and Kneiding (2008).   9 
those  who  received  bank  loans,  less  than  5%  of  the  subsample  still  required 
additional  funds  showing  that  when  banks  provide  financial  assistance  to  young 
businesses, the loans they provide are of sufficient size.
14  
The right sub-sample on the middle fraction of Figure 1 provides further information 
on those 16% of borrowers who needed outside finance but did not apply for a bank 
loan. They had access to other sources (loans from friends and family or from an 
existing overdraft). These persons had, thus, need for external finance but decided 
not to base the financing of their business on a new bank loan. 
The subsample on the bottom right is comprised of business owners who did apply 
for a loan maybe more than once but were rejected. The reasons for rejection were 
unknown since banks usually do not disclose this information to applicants.
15 36% of 
all  applicants  were  rejected  by  banks.  About  half  of  the  rejected  loan  applicants 
reported a funding gap or adjusted their investment volumes, while the other half got 
access to private loans. 
Interestingly, survival rates differed between those who needed no outside finance or 
received a loan from a bank (being put together in one group) and those who needed 
outside finance but started with a private loan or no loan. Without being able to 
analyze  any  causality,  in  the  first  group  (businesses  which  were  started  without 
outside finance or with a bank loan) the survival rate was significantly lower (on the 
1% level when using the Fisher test) when compared to those who needed outside 
finance but started without a bank loan.  
Observation 1: Our comparative static analysis revealed that 36% of  all business 
owners had a demand for outside finance. Of them 21% received a loan from a bank 
after the first application, another 33% also received bank loans but only after having 
applied more than once for a bank loan. 16% of those who needed outside finance 
did not apply for a bank loan and 30% applied for a bank loan but were not able to 
sign a loan contract. 
As  earlier  studies  found  that  raising  capital  poses  a  problem  to  business  owners 
(Egeln et al., 1997, Winker, 1999, and Audretsch and Elstons, 2002), we can confirm 
that such financing problems exist and we were able to give new insights by making 
use of a comparative static analysis in what way financing problems arise and how 
they are handled by the business owners. 
 
                                                 
14 This coincides with the findings of Lamberson and Johnson (1992) who interviewed 140 firms on 
their financing experiences, of whom only 6% reported dissatisfaction with the amount of credit 
available. 
15 Evidence from interviews with loan officers reveals that the main reasons for rejection are (i) low 
loan volumes, (ii) poor business concepts, (iii) redlining of certain industries (e.g. retail), and (iv) a 
low degree of borrower creditworthiness (IAB et al., 2005).   10 
3.2 Comparison of borrowers vs. non-borrowers 
For the subsequent analysis, we split the sample into two groups: those 36% of the 
persons in the sample who required (not received) outside finance will be called 
‘borrowers’. Those persons who never asked for a loan (not even from friends and 
family) because they had sufficient equity capital to finance their business (64% of 
the sample) will be called ‘non-borrowers’.  
This distinction is made for the following reasons: it seems appropriate to observe 
those persons more intensely who were in need of outside finance in the past, as they 
represent the potential customer group for microloans. (Among this group are also 
persons who applied for loans and were actively excluded.) As it would have made 
less sense to ask persons with no need for outside finance about their inclination 
towards  a  microfinance  product  -  their  statements  would  be  hypothetical  in  this 
respect – we explicitly decided to ask non-borrowers for the main reason why they 
refrained from borrowing.
16 
Among the non-borrowers roughly two-thirds had no need for larger  amounts of 
capital during the first three years of operations, or had enough funds (either from 
their own savings or from public support instruments such as the bridging allowance, 
for more details on the latter, cf. Caliendo and Kritikos, 2007). About one-third of all 
non-borrowers said that they were afraid of indebtedness which stopped them from 
applying for a loan. They adjusted the size of their business to their own existing 
funds.  A  certain  (but  unknown)  share  of  non-borrowers  might  be  excluded  from 
access to bank loans, even though it is not possible to verify this assumption.  
Table 2 compares characteristics of borrowers and non-borrowers. The variables are 
classified  according  to  the  attributes  describing  the  business  owner  (personal 
characteristics),  those  describing  the  business  (business  characteristics),  and  the 
funding needs of the firm for each of the first three years (financial characteristics). 
- insert Table 2 about here - 
Thirty-seven  percent  of  the  borrowers  had  started  retail  or  crafts  businesses, 
compared to a mere 11% of non-borrowers. A Fisher test reveals that retail (p=.049) 
and crafts enterprises (p=.048) exhibit significantly greater financial needs during the 
first three years than do other lines of business. This is plausible given that most of 
the businesses require higher investments for purchasing physical stock or machines. 
Funding needs of borrowers and non-borrowers during their start-up period average 
out  at  about  €15,000.  Table  3  gives  additional  information  beyond  the  overall 
                                                 
16 We were encouraged do so as those persons from the pre-tests and from the focus group who had no 
need for outside finance clarified in a strict way that they would not be interested in a micro-loan 
which is why they were not able to give meaningful answers to specific questions about features of 
such loans.   11 
average, namely the funding needs separated for borrowers and non-borrowers for 
each  of  the  three  years  in  consideration.  A  clear  distinction  can  be  observed  (a) 
between year one and the two following years, as well as (b) between borrowers and 
non-borrowers. While more than 80% of the non-borrowers needed less than €10,000 
in the first year, this was the case for only 47% of the borrowers: more than a quarter 
of these businesses required more than €25,000. The levels of funding needs in the 
two subsequent years differ significantly from the first, while years two and three 
both exhibit similar patterns. Obviously, in both groups, there is a high percentage of 
businesses that exhibit no funding needs at all after year one. (c) Moreover, we are 
able to reveal two kinds of investment patterns: one group of businesses requiring 
one-time funding, and a second group with recurring funding needs.  
- insert Table 3 about here - 
Respondents were asked to specify the main intended use of funds in each of the 
three  years.  A  large  percentage  of  businesses  used  the  funds  to  cover  start-up 
expenses such as  IT infrastructure, office  equipment, and materials for their first 
fiscal year. What is crucial to know for the design of microfinance products is that 
liquidity  finance  played  an  important  role  for  the  borrower  group  in  the  two 
following years: more than 50% reported liquidity gaps that had to be closed, for 
instance, the entrepreneur’s own costs of living and pre-financing customer orders. 
Cases of ‘emergency finance’, such as back duties falling due, were also mentioned. 
4. Empirical analysis 
In this section, we will concentrate on persons with need for ‘outside finance’. This 
is an umbrella term for all financial resources that do not constitute equity capital, for 
instance, bank loans and private loans obtained through friends or relatives. In this 
respect, we employ a broad definition of outside finance, as our sample contains also 
persons who were in need of loans but were rejected from banks or who used loans 
from their personal environment.  
4.1 Direct demand analysis 
A straightforward way of understanding the demand for a certain product is asking 
potential customers directly about their preferences. Two methods were employed 
throughout the course of the interview. In the first version, respondents were asked to 
name the three most important product criteria a microloan should have; the second 
approach required them to rank given criteria on a scale from 1 to 5. However, the 
information  provided  was  inconsistent:  while  the  unguided  questions  prompted   12 
answers mostly related to interest rates,
17 then to maturity, and flexibility of the loan 
product,  the  ranking  exercise  showed  a  strong  preference  for  ‘soft’  criteria  like 
customer liaison and support. This reveals an important weakness of direct demand 
analysis: answers are strongly influenced by the survey format, and thereby lead to 
inconclusive  results.  This  problem  can  be  mitigated  by  presenting  respondents  a 
generic microloan and thereby indirectly eliciting their preferences. 
4.2 Indirect demand analysis: Tests and Results 
We presented the following typical properties  of a microloan to  all persons who 
needed  external  finance.  The  features  are  based  on  actual  microloans  offered  in 
countries such as the UK or France.
18 
·  the loan value varies between €1,000 and €10,000; 
·  the term of each loan ranges between one and two years; 
·  there is no amortization-free period; 
·  the repayment scheme is fully flexible (comparable to an overdraft facility); 
·  applicants are informed of the credit decision within five days; 
·  interest rates amount to approximately 20% per annum; 
·  the  loan  officer  acts  as  a  partner  to  the  client  and  problems  are  solved 
cooperatively; 
·  different kinds of collateral can be used. 
It was mentioned explicitly in the interview that loans with these characteristics are 
only offered by MFIs in these countries. Respondents were then asked whether they 
would ‘buy’ such a loan. If respondents rejected it, they were asked why. If they said 
that interest rates were the main reason, we presented a showcase calculation giving 
interest  payments  in  absolute  terms  (a  strategy  commonly  used  by  MFIs). 
Respondents  were  then  asked  if  this  display  would  change  their  minds.  A 
dichotomous variable ‘target group’ was defined to take the value 1 if respondents 
were interested in the product and 0 if they were either not interested or not sure. 31 
respondents (41% of the borrower group) revealed their interest in a microloan. 
In order to explore what kind of experiences all persons of the borrower group had 
during  their  bank  meetings  and  which  product  features  are  important  to  these 
persons, all respondents were asked to rate various product features and the service 
quality  they  experienced  during  their  most  recent  bank  meeting  on  a  Likert-type 
scale varying from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). More specifically, we 
then compared the answers on these questions between the two groups. To do so, we 
employ a Mann-Whitney U test to analyze group-specific differences. 
                                                 
17 It is certainly not surprising that many persons being asked about product features will demand low 
prices, in this case interest rates, in the first place. However, such information does not allow 
discriminating between persons who are interested in a microloan and those who are not. 
18 Specific product features are discussed, e.g., in Copisarow (2000), Vigenina and Kritikos (2004), or 
EMN (2006) among others.   13 
4.2.1 The Impact of Previous Experiences with Traditional Banks  
We start with the experiences persons reported from their bank meeting, and we 
compare persons who showed interest in microloans (abbreviated as target group 
members ‘T’) with those who did not (‘NT’). Lower mean ranks for those who were 
interested in microloans indicate that the sum of the ranks must be smaller than the 
sum of the ranks for those who were not. Table 4 illustrates the results. The mean 
ranks indicate that micro business owners who were interested in microloans rate the 
bank’s  customer  service  lower  than  the  NT-group.  Moreover,  for  three  items  we 
observe that all differences in the mean ranks are weakly significant. 
-  insert Table 4 about here - 
In this context, however, it is important to note that among those persons interested 
in microloans there is a higher share that was rejected from a bank (namely around 
50%), while rejection rates among persons who were not interested in microloans 
were only little more than 20%. Therefore, the data may contain a success bias as 
those who received a bank loan may evaluate their meetings with the bank more 
positively. On the other hand, the bad experience of not receiving a loan may result 
in a negative evaluation due to the unsatisfactory outcome.  
Therefore,  we  repeated  the  comparison  of  persons  who  were  interested  in  a 
microloan with the NT-group, but concentrated in both groups on those applicants 
who  received  a  loan.  Thereby,  we  are  able  to  control  for  the  above  mentioned 
success bias. Again, we apply a Mann-Whitney U test. Table 5 presents the results.  
- insert Table 5 about here - 
Interestingly, the findings from our previous results are unambiguously confirmed. 
Business owners who showed an interest in microloan products had significantly 
worse  experiences  during  their  bank  meetings  than  the  NT-group,  even  if  both 
groups  received  a  bank  loan.  The  target  group’s  evaluation  of  the  meetings  was 
significantly less positive, and they indicated that they had been taken less seriously 
as  fully  fledged  clients.  Furthermore,  their  responses  differed  greatly  regarding 
whether bank employees understood their business concepts and provided them with 
sufficient information on the terms and conditions of the possible loan products.  
Observation 2: Prior negative experiences with banks are positively correlated with 
target group membership, even if the business owner received a loan from a bank.  
4.2.2 Crucial product features 
With respect to the second set of questions, we aimed to find out which product 
features are important to potential microloan clients.  
- insert Table 6 about here -   14 
The rank-sum test reveals two significant differences between the two sub-samples 
(see Table 6). First, business owners who showed an interest in microloans stated 
that they operate in segments that demand fast access to loans. Second, they were 
willing to pay higher interest rates for faster access to loans. Interestingly, product 
features  (which  were  named  as  important  when  directly  asked)  like  flexible 
repayment schemes, amortization-free periods, and individual support from a loan 
officer are clearly not important enough to allow distinctions to be drawn between 
the two groups. 
Finally,  we  analyzed  the  correlations  between  bank  assessments  and  product 
features. Our results show that applicants who gave an overall bad rating of bank 
meetings were actually willing to pay higher interest rates for loans. The same holds 
for those who stated that they had not been treated as fully fledged clients.  
Observation  3:  Borrowers  who  are  interested  in  microloans  are  prepared  to  pay 
higher interest rates if, in return the access to the loan is fast and easy. 
4.3 Do target group members exhibit a typical financing pattern? 
We also aimed to find out whether persons interested in microloans exhibit a typical 
financing pattern. To analyze this question we used again target group membership 
as the defining variable and compared the financing patterns among the two groups 
(see Figure 2). There is a clear discrepancy between the funding needs revealing that 
borrowers interested in microloan products exhibit a specific financing pattern. Over 
the three-year period, the target group exhibits fairly constant funding needs, while 
the other group of persons (who do not need any microloan access) reports higher 
funding  needs  in  the  first  year  and  rather  low  needs  in  years  two  and  three.  An 
ANOVA test was conducted to compare the groups’ funding needs in each  year, 
yielding a significant F value only for the first period. We presume that a lower level 
of start-up finance is a distinguishing feature of the target group. 
- insert Figure 2 about here - 
Unlike non-target group members, the target group reported an average of €6,000 to 
€12,000 per year over the three-year period.
19 This is a possible benchmark loan size 
for microloans. Funding needs of non-target group clients, in contrast, average at 
€19,000
20 in year one and drop to far below €5,000 in the subsequent two years. The 
higher  funding volume  in the first  year might indicate that these borrowers have 
received bank loans that are generally approved only beyond a certain amount. In 
this case, banks are usually more willing to finance subsequent loans. Our analysis 
                                                 
19 Figure 2 is adjusted for seven outliers within the borrower group as they distorted the means quite 
heavily (including the outliers, means oscillate between €15,000 and €20,000). The 75
th percentile 
including outliers is € 25,000. 
20 The average is € 32,000 if we do not adjust for outliers.   15 
also showed that these borrowers were granted overdraft facilities significantly more 
often than target group members in the years after founding the business. 
Equity ratios of the two groups display a palpable discrepancy as well: target group 
members continuously exhibit lower equity ratios than non-target group members. 
An  ANOVA  test  confirms  statistically  significant  differences  for  the  first  year 
(p=.02).  As  a  certain  amount  of  equity  capital  is  the  necessary  precondition  for 
receiving a bank loan, it is quite probable that target group members are more often 
excluded from the formal banking system. Therefore, microloans present a viable 
funding alternative and higher interest rates do not deter them. 
Observation 4: Compared to non-target group members, microloan applicants have i) 
lower funding needs during the start-up phase, ii) more evenly distributed funding 
needs, and iii) less equity. 
As most existing MFIs – not only in Germany but also in most Western European 
countries - offer loan products only to start-ups in year one, this observation probably 
explains why there is such an exceptionally low demand for these products. 
4.4 A model for determining target group membership 
In order to determine relevant factors affecting target group membership, a model for 
the complete borrower group was employed. A binary logit regression was used with 
‘target group’ as the dependent variable. In Model A, personal explanatory variables 
were  applied.  The  business  variables  were  added  to  perform  a  second  Model  B. 
Finally, an extended Model C was estimated, in which financial characteristics of the 
firm were included. The improvement in overall model fit was assessed with the 
pseudo R² measures Nagelkerke R² and Cox & Snell R² (see also Hair et al. 2005; 
Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). In combination, they indicate that Model A accounts 
for more than 25% of the variation in the target group membership. Adding further 
variables in Models B and C leads to substantial improvements in model fit, with 
Model C accounting for at least 50% of the variation between the target groups. 
Table 7 reports the estimation results of the three models employed. The business 
owner’s age does not have a significant impact on target group membership. The 
same holds for gender, which is only weakly significant in Model C. Foreigners have 
a higher propensity to be interested in microloan products, which could be due to the 
fact that they are more often excluded from the banking system.
21 Concerning the 
education variables, master craftsmen have a significantly lower propensity to belong 
to the target group, which is indicated by the negative sign of the dummy. They 
                                                 
21 Blanchflower et al. (2003) find similar evidence for the US credit market.   16 
usually have higher funding needs during the start-up period due to more expensive 
equipment than, for example, businesses in the service sector.  
- insert Table 7 about here - 
With respect to the business variables, we observe that firms operating in the retail 
business  have  a  strong  propensity  towards  microloans.  This  coincides  with  our 
findings that potential microloan clients need fast access to funds. Retail business is 
traditionally  characterized  by  near-term  funding  needs,  often  triggered  by  the 
requirement  to  pre-finance  inventory  (van  Auken  and  Carter,  1989).  The  other 
industry  dummies  have  no  significant  bearing  on  target  group  membership.  We 
therefore conclude that being a retail business is the only relevant firm characteristic 
that determines target group membership - a result that coincides with the evidence 
from many countries when microfinance products were introduced (see e.g. Kritikos 
and Vigenina 2005) and with the anecdotal evidence that owners of firms in the retail 
business sector are “redlined” by commercial banks.
22 
Model C contains a set of dummies providing information on the firm’s funding 
characteristics. Businesses that received a private loan during their first three years of 
operations  tend  to  show  a  significantly  higher  interest  in  microloans.  Anecdotal 
evidence  from  the  interviews  confirms  that  people  who  have  received  funding 
through private loans are reluctant to borrow from friends and relatives in the future, 
as this implies a certain kind of social dependency. Applicants who had previously 
received  a  bank  loan  are  less  likely  to  belong  to  the  target  group  due  to  their 
preference for the lower interest rates offered by banks. This confirms the conjecture 
we made when analyzing funding patterns. Finally, the dummy ‘funding needs in 
year two or three’ does affect target group membership positively. This validates our 
financing pattern analysis, which showed rather constant funding needs for the target 
group and therefore an elevated need for finance after foundation of the business.  
Observation  5:  Business  owners  who  are  interested  in  microloans  can  be  found 
among foreign and among retail business owners as well as among those who had 
previously  received  private  loans.  Those,  who  showed  investment  patterns  with 
constant investment volumes over the years, and those who needed finance in the 
years after business foundation, were also more likely to belong to the target group.  
 
 
                                                 
22 Interestingly, in the East-German sample also business owners from the service sector were 
interested in microloans. This is the only difference in the observations between West- and East-
Germany, see also Kritikos and Kneiding (2008).   17 
5. Conclusion 
It almost goes without saying that micro businesses have more difficulties in getting 
outside finance than larger firms. In response to a potential demand for microfinance, 
several  MFIs  have  been  set  up  during  the  last  decade  in  Germany  (rather  late 
compared to countries like England or France) offering microloans particularly to 
start-ups.  However,  their  outreach  remained  far  below  expectations.  Their 
disappointing  experiences  revealed  that  beyond  the  basic  insights  that  business 
owners (also in Germany) face higher financing problems the smaller their firms are, 
little is known about financial sources micro entrepreneurs are making use of. 
This pilot study investigates the demand side of this market segment in Germany. 
We conducted a first survey of 213 entrepreneurs, and identified their funding needs, 
their financing problems and their product preferences with regard to microloans. 
Moreover,  we  were  able  to  reveal  which  groups  express  specific  interests  in 
microloans. Two out of three business owners in our sample reported that they were 
able to operate without outside finance and that they were not interested in taking 
any loan from banks, friends or family members. Among the other business owners 
who were in need of outside finance, little more than half of them were able to get a 
loan from banks, while the other half was rejected or did not try to get a bank loan; 
thus  the  second  half  started  with  loans  from  friends  or  family,  reduced  their 
investment volume or faced liquidity constraints. 
Concerning the extent of the problem from a market-based point of view, our results 
can be interpreted in two ways: When related to the overall number of entrepreneurs 
it  seems  as  if  only  a  minority  of  businesses  is  actually  excluded  from  access  to 
outside finance which signals that the share of underfinanced micro business owners 
is negligible.
23 However, as it is not possible to reveal whether persons who did not 
apply for a bank loan are also excluded from access to credit, it is more meaningful 
to relate persons who had no access to bank loans to those who applied for a loan. In 
this context the rate of financing problems is substantial, as we showed applicants 
had to apply more than once for a bank loan or were completely rejected.  
Based on these findings, we analyzed the potential demand for microloans. We found 
out that in our sample little less than half of the business owners being in need of 
outside  finance  were  interested  in  a  microloan  with  all  its  specific  features.  We 
consider these people to be members of the target group while we termed persons 
who  had  no  interest  in  microloans  as  non-members.  As  we  found  two  different 
financing  patterns,  we  are  able  to  further  specify  the  target  group:  non-members 
                                                 
23 This kind of policy is followed for instance by the German State owned bank KfW – see their recent 
report on microfinance, KfW (2008).   18 
needed funds particularly during their start-up phase, while target group members 
exhibited fairly constant funding needs over the first three years of operations and 
significantly  lower  funding  needs  than  the  non-members  in  year  one.  We,  thus, 
revealed a kind of investment pattern to which traditional banks have not yet adjusted 
and which fits to the approach of microfinance products. 
We  show  that  MFIs  need  to  focus  on  certain  types  of  potential  clients  that  are 
particularly interested in microlending products; in our survey these were migrants 
and retail business owners, persons who received loans from their private network or 
who were dissatisfied with the service quality offered by banks where they had felt 
patronized by loan officers. Moreover, the decisive features to create a demand for 
microlending products at higher interest rates are: quick and easy access to loans, a 
high probability of loan approval once a business owner decided to apply for a loan, 
and an environment which does not remind the clients of their last bank visit. 
In order to provide such good service quality to their customers, MFIs will have to 
employ professionally trained loan officers who are able to put the crucial product 
features into action and to carry out effective screening procedures at the same time 
in order to maintain a low percentage of high-risk clients. Only then will an MFI 
successfully attract customers and be able to promote its unique advantages over 
commercial banks.  
Our  research,  although  relatively  small  in  terms  of  sample  size,  also  gives 
preliminary evidence that by targeting only start-ups the existing government-owned 
or  government-financed  MFIs  unnecessarily  confined  their  target  markets. 
Furthermore,  the  loan  products  they  offered  seemed  to  be  inappropriate  to  the 
demand of their potential clients.  
In this context it is also necessary to ask whether improving the access to external 
finance for micro entrepreneurs is an effective strategy from a more macroeconomic 
point of view. One might argue that, if micro  entrepreneurs partly cannot obtain 
external finance without new microloan products, larger firms who have access to 
outside finance might take over the market shares of the excluded companies so that 
the overall economy is in the same state without a microfinance approach. However, 
there  are  several  reasons  why  access  to  microloans  is  an  important  issue.  Most 
prominently, competition increases if micro entrepreneurs do not face higher barriers 
to financial means than larger firms which is why micro businesses should at least 
have similar options of accessing external finance. It could be further argued that 
micro entrepreneurs are better able than larger firms to serve the individual customer 
needs  and  by  doing  so  micro  entrepreneurs  may  contribute  to  the  growth  of  the 
economy. Last but not least, it is important from the labor market’s point of view to 
provide micro entrepreneurs with access to finance given that with micro funding   19 
available, entrepreneurs are better able to create and maintain their own job and, with 
a certain probability, additional jobs as well. 
We conclude that, although different and certainly smaller than expected, there are 
markets for microlending in industrialized countries such as Germany. They have a 
potential to further grow especially if there should be a latent demand among those 
business  owners  who  were  afraid  of  asking  for  a  loan.  To  this  end,  additional 
research with larger survey data would be helpful.    20 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Overview over differing shares borrowers and non-borrowers. 
The share of borrowers that  Percent per subgroup of 
borrowers (N= 76) 
Percent overall 
(N=213) 
Used bank loans   54%  19% 
Were rejected from banks  30%  11% 
Used  Private  loans  and/or  equity 
without  having  asked  for  a  bank 
loan or after rejection at bank 
30%  11% 




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the two subsamples. 
*** significant at a 1% level   ** significant at a 5% level   * significant at a 10% level (‘-‘ indicates 
that more than 10% of cells have expected count less than 5) 
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Funding needs year 1 (‘000 €)ª 
Funding needs year 2 (‘000 €)ª 
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Table 3: Comparison of funding needs between borrowers (B) and non-borrowers 
(NB), in %. 
 













None  2.6  13.1  50.0  65.0  52.6  65.7 
Less than €5,000  19.7  43.8  25.0  24.1  26.3  26.3 
> €5,000 – €10,000   25.0  24.1  11.8  8.0  9.2  6.6 
> €10,000 – 
€25,000  
23.7  14.6  9.2  1.5  6.6  1.5 
> €25,000 – 
€50,000  
19.7  3.6  1.3  1.5  2.6  0 
More than 
€50,000 












35% had funding gap
52% used combination of private loan and 
equity




58% used combination of private loan
and equity











35% had funding gap
52% used combination of private loan and 
equity




58% used combination of private loan
and equity
17% used existing overdraft
25% other
 









   25 
 
Table  4:  Comparison  of  target  group  (T)  and  non-target  group  members  (NT) 
(N=74). 
 
Mean ranks  Statements 
T  NT 
z-value 
(Prob > |z|) 
All in all, I have a positive impression of 
my meeting(s) with the bank(s). 
26.96  31.94  -1.112 
(0.266) 
I felt I was taken seriously and treated as a 
fully fledged client. 
24.91  33.25  -1.86 
(0.063) 
I had the feeling that the loan officer to 
whom I spoke understood my business 
plan. 
24.27  31.97  -1.754 
(0.079) 
I received competent advice concerning 
relevant products. 
23.45  26.87  -0.83 
(0.407) 
I received comprehensive information on 
all terms and conditions. 




Table 5: Comparison of target group (T) and non-target group members (NT) who 
received a loan (N=40). 
 
Mean ranks  Statements 
T  NT 
z-value 
(Prob > |z|) 
All in all, I have a positive impression of 







I felt I was taken seriously and treated as a 







I had the feeling that the loan officer to 





21.65  -2.03 
(0.042) 









I received comprehensive information on 
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Table 6: Comparison of target group members (T) and non-target group members 
(NT) (N=74). 
 
Mean ranks  Statements 
T  NT 
z-value 
(Prob > |z|) 
I am agreeable to accepting higher interest 
rates when taking a loan if this allows 




37.21  -0.28 
(0.8) 
In my line of business, it is crucial to 







It matters to me to pay no amortizations, 





35.64  -0.92 
(0.36) 
I am willing to pay higher interest rates 







Individual support given by the contact 
person is as important to me as to the 




























































Figure 2: Funding needs (lines, right scale) and equity ratios (bars, left scale) of 
target group and non-target group members adjusted for outliers with funding needs 
exceeding €50,000 (N=69). 
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Table 7: Binary Logit Estimation of determinants of target group membership. 
Explanatory Variables  Model A  Model B  Model C 
Gender (female=1)  -0.63 (0.64)  -0.97 (0.77)  -2.83 (1.63)* 
Age  -0.03 (0.04)  0.02 (0.05)  -0.03 (0.08) 
Nationality (foreigner=1)  2.47 (1.54)*  2.44 (1.44)*  5.04 (2.46)** 
Education 
  (academics=1) 










Preceding period of unem-
ployment (months) 
0.01 (0.03)  -0.01 (0.03)  0.08 (0.07) 
Line of business 
  (retail=1) 
  (crafts=1) 











Team foundation    2.03 (1.11)*  3.44 (2.15) 
Received private loan      2.46 (1.40)* 
Received bank loan      -4.85 (1.96)** 
Received overdraft      -1.03 (1.66) 
Liquidity finance      -2.71 (1.90) 
Funding needs in year 2 or 3       2.64 (1.64)* 
Constant  1.38 (1.78)  -1.34 (2.26)  0.43 (3.62) 
Nagelkerke R²  0.345  0.485  0.754 
Cox & Snell R²  0.254  0.357  0.556 
Model Chi²  50.28  27.4  18.21 
Number of observations  75  75  75 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** significant at a 1% level    ** significant at a 5% level    * significant at a 10% level 
 